Economic activities affect the environment through a multiplicity of channels. Besides generating GHG 5 emissions that induce climatic changes, every modern economy is connected to the environment throughout a 6 continuous flow of materials. To generate economic wealth, a modern economy demands natural resources, and 7 produces a continuous flow of waste. The scarcity of natural resources and the negative externalities arising 8 from their extraction, their industrial processing and their final disposal seem natural motivations for the current 9 policy push towards a more dematerialized and a more circular economy. The main contribution of this paper is 10 a qualitative assessment of this strategy. To this aim, we discuss some of the most promising policies put 11 forward by the DYNAMIX project. On the basis of the qualitative policy assessment performed in DYNAMIX, 12 we illustrate why these measures might be worth serious consideration. A discussion regarding the political 13 economy of the policies under scrutiny complements the analysis of their effectiveness and efficiency.
1.

Introduction
In recent years, global consumption of natural resources has drastically increased (Krausmann et al. 2009 ).
In terms of growth rates, these have more than doubled over the last decade, and in some cases, they reached unprecedented levels in the range of five percent per year (Global Material Flows Database, 2016) . This computer software, new media, electronic databases and libraries, and Internet delivery of goods and services" Our assessment of the policy mix described above yields four main results. First, a comprehensive policy mix is far more promising than a single policy instrument, when the desired change in the economy is as 156 profound as the one required by a dematerialization process. This is indeed consistent with the basic for which results in terms of RMC figures vary by more than 40% between Bruckner et al. (2012) and Wiedmann et al. (2015) .
201
The heterogeneity in computed RMC levels across studies needs serious consideration in any discussion 202 based on RMC figures. This issue however, ois even more crucial when it comes to policy intervention. In this 203 perspective, in fact the whole policy strategy in this area may be undermined an intrinsic uncertainty. Consider 204 for example the fact that the US and the EU are among the world largest resource consumers. Uncertain figures 205 about their respective RMC levels acquire political relevance, as they imply a shift in responsibility towards the 206 world for each country's consumption levels. In more general terms this issue deserves due attention in the 207 assessment of the feasibility.
208
One important factor influencing RMC results is the number of countries, which are considered exogenous 209 in the computation exercise, and for which the domestic technology assumption is adopted. Clearly, (2015) . In this section, we rely on this last 214 computation as in our knowledge it is the one with the highest country-coverage.
215 Table 1 reports selected RMC figures from Wiedmann et al. (2015) . This data shows that the EU is the world 216 second-largest consumer of metals and non-metallic minerals, with a share of around 17%. RMC figures indicate 217 the role that each country can play in terms of reduction of current consumption at the global level. Any country 218 can ideally control its level of RMC, but the effects of a change in that level on total world extraction needs to be 219 quantified through appropriate modelling instruments. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any study 220 quantifying the effects on world RMC of a unilateral change in the RMC by the EU. This lack of knowledge is a 221 crucial point in policy perspective, as it impairs a transparent communication of any measure aiming at 222 reducing current RMC levels. 
223
232
RMC by less than 7.83%. If the RMC in metal ores were to decline by 80% (as indicated in one of the Project key 233 targets) the effect would be no larger than -13.69% for global metal ores RMC. These results are clearly very 234 simplistic because they assume that foreign countries do not react to the lower demand for natural resources.
supposed that these rapidly transfer to other countries which adopt them and start reducing their RMC as well.
global trends in resource consumption. Although the willingness of these countries to act together in this 244 direction is obviously very hard to assess, we try to provide some insight in this respect in the next paragraphs.
245
In order to analyse the EU approach to dematerialization in a global context, we first provide an overview of the 246 EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy, which was announced in December 2015. While a number of various 247 dematerialization policies were implemented on the level of Member States, the Plan provides the first 248 comprehensive framework in this area at the EU level. Next, we compare the approach presented in the Plan 249 with policy actions in three major global economies: Japan, USA, and China.
250
In order to map the initiatives announced in the EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy, we apply the 251 policy classification used in the DYNAMIX project (Umpfenbach, 2013) . The mapping approach summarised in 252 255 (EC, 2014) , which were both focused on waste management targets. Second, there are no absolute limits set for 256 the consumption of materials. This lack of strong policy targets in the area of resource efficiency stands in sharp 257 contrast with the EU approach to climate and environmental policy, where absolute emission caps are the 258 foundation for policy action. Third, the policy mix proposed in the Plan does not include any overarching taxes 259 related to material use, which could provide the EU-wide price signal to move towards more circular economy 260 (EASAC, 2015) . Instead, the Plan focuses mainly on regulatory, cooperation-, and information-based measures 261 on the EU level, while encouraging the Member States to introduce tax measures on their own. These three 262 features confirm previous findings on the EU resource efficiency policy, which suggested that the latter is 263 framed mainly as an economic rather than environmental policy (Happaerts, 2014) . All in all, this results in a 264 focus on improved material efficiency rather than on absolute decoupling. Information-based  Guidance and promotion of best practices in waste prevention and reuse, mining waste management plans recovery of critical raw materials, pre-demolition assessment, substitution of hazardous substances of very high concern, and cascading use of biomass. 
265
The policy mix
exercise in this paper. In order to illustrate the logic behind its structure, let us recall the standard sequence of economic activities, which starts with the extraction of virgin materials and ends with their final disposal. We it pursues the reduction of externalities related to the extraction and refinement activities. On the other hand, it 349 eventually contributes to reduce virgin material use. It is important to note that the objective of the policy mix is 350 not the internalization of the external costs of production, which arise in Phase 2. Once materials enter the 351 manufacturing process (Phase 2), externalities clearly arise from their transformation, but the nature of these 352 impacts is mostly sector-specific. From this viewpoint, a policy initiative targeting sectorial externalities is 353 basically a sector-specific policy, which ideally complements the intervention of this policy mix.
354
In view of its specific focus, the policy mix in this paper differs from any of the three policy mixes designed 
366
Our characterisation of the policy mix follows a sort of bottom-up approach. First, it deals separately with 367 the single policy instruments contained in the mix; then it provides a more comprehensive analysis of the policy 368 mix as a whole. Consistently with the general aim of the policy mix, the core instrument is a material tax, which 369 is raised on all materials that enter the production process for their "first industrial use". The direct effect of this 370 measure is a change in the relative price system faced by EU manufacturing firms. In order to avoid import 371 substitution, the tax is imposed also on imports of refined materials. To improve both its effectiveness and its 372 feasibility, this instrument is meant as a part of a green tax reform (GTR) scheme. This implies an automatic 373 earmarking of tax revenues to another policy instrument, which has the role of supporting the fiscal measure.
374
Earmarking here is suggested only with a view to increase the feasibility of the measure. Note that in more 
391
The policy mix is completed by two additional measures. One of them (a skill enhancement programme)
392
aims at further supporting firms on the path towards dematerialization. Firms face higher material prices, and 393 they would find it convenient to modify their input mix from more resource-intensive to more labour-(or 
404
The last instrument included in the policy mix is a set of product standards. As mentioned in the 
413
This section illustrates the results of the qualitative assessment of the policy mix described in the previous 414 section. The analysis follows the methodology illustrated in section 3. In the first part, it discusses each policy 415 instrument separately, while in the second part it reports on the outcome of the more general evaluation of the 416 policy mix. For sake of exposition, the four criteria described in Section 4 will be treated separately throughout 417 the whole section, although they are obviously interdependent.
418
reasoning mostly makes sense in a static perspective. In the perspective of inducing technological change, its applicability is less straightforward. In a dynamic perspective (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2003) point to the superiority of taxes or permits in inducing the firm to adopt innovation beyond the level prescribed of the standard, if the innovation gives a cost advantage and hence allows saving on taxes or on purchasing the allowances. This however remains ultimately an empirical matter, and more recent works in general cannot find an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments in view of promoting environmental R&D.. 7 A tax can become operational in few months depending on duration of the legislative process needed to make it effective, and can be applied una tantum or gradually along several years; the other two measures typically take a few to many years to yield significant results.
The green tax reform (GTR)
420
The quantitative literature on GTRs is quite extensive (see for example the surveys provided by Bosquet, 421 2000 and Gago et al., 2013) but the number of papers focusing on dematerialization policies is quite small, as this 422 topic is quite novel in environmental policy. Two contributions worth mentioning are Dellink and Kandelaars that promote material efficiency such as a material tax should be a credible and steady feature for these markets,
465
as they represent continuous incentives to innovate and have the potential to eventually bring innovations to 466 reach the market and to be adopted by consumers.
Efficiency is usually a major strength of GTRs. This type of policy, in fact, usually pursues a correction of an that it is not possible to exclude the case of negative effects on the economy 12 . If economic effects are negative, policy effectiveness becomes crucial for political feasibility and for the entire policy initiative. However, for this policy mix (and for any other measure aiming at reducing virgin material consumption in the EU) the evaluation possibility of free-riding behaviour among countries which is indeed very probable considering the high
Conclusions
policy mix, which aims at fostering the socially efficient use of virgin materials at firm level. These policies own and A. Sniegocki (2015 
